對外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)國際經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易學(xué)院邀請Ricard Gil作了一場題為“Relational Adaptation Under Reel Authority(盤局下的適應(yīng)關(guān)系)”的講座。國際經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易學(xué)院有8個(gè)系，分別是：國際貿(mào)易學(xué)系、金融學(xué)系、經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)系、國際運(yùn)輸與物流學(xué)系、政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)系、國際商務(wù)與合作學(xué)系、數(shù)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)系、財(cái)政稅務(wù)學(xué)系。 講座的主要內(nèi)容是：

　　我們研究中，各方必須反復(fù)裁縫決定世界的狀態(tài)，但通常具有不同的優(yōu)先決策的長期合作關(guān)系。我們的理論分析表明如何適應(yīng)關(guān)系(即自我實(shí)施促進(jìn)有效的適應(yīng)協(xié)議)，帶正規(guī)合同相結(jié)合，引起國家相關(guān)決策時(shí)無論是正式的合同或單獨(dú)承包關(guān)系下的預(yù)期收益可以提高。我們的實(shí)證分析側(cè)重于電影發(fā)行商和放映商，允許對是否顯示影片以及在什么時(shí)段參展商廣泛的回旋余地之間的正式收入分成合同。這些正式合同的電影完成了它運(yùn)行后，即經(jīng)常非正式地重新談判，任何改編決定已經(jīng)作出，由參展商后不久。我們的實(shí)證設(shè)置是有吸引力的，因?yàn)槲覀冇^察到：(1)本正式的收入分享合同條款;(2)所有的決定已經(jīng)作出后發(fā)生的正式合同條款重新談判的非正式;(3)的代理世界兩個(gè)狀態(tài)和適應(yīng)決定(實(shí)際上是示出什么電影，以及在什么時(shí)隙)(從替代電影為同一時(shí)隙競爭的潛在收入)。我們的理論和實(shí)證研究結(jié)果表明，正式合同可以為實(shí)現(xiàn)波動(dòng)的環(huán)境中高效適應(yīng)非正式的關(guān)系奠定了基礎(chǔ)。

　　原文：We study ongoing relationships in which parties must repeatedly tailor decisions to the state of the world, but typically have different preferred decisions. Our theoretical analysis shows how relational adaptation (i.e., self-enforcing agreements that facilitate efficient adaptation), combined with formal contracting, induces state-dependent decision-making that improves upon the expected payoffs under either formal contracting or relational contracting alone. Our empirical analysis focuses on formal revenue-sharing contracts between movie distributors and exhibitors that allow the exhibitor wide leeway about whether to show the movie and in what time slots. These formal contracts are often informally renegotiated after the movie has finished its run—i.e., long after any adaptation decisions have been taken by the exhibitor. Our empirical setting is attractive because we observe: (i) the formal revenue-sharing contract terms; (ii) informal renegotiations of the formal contract terms that occur after all decisions have been made; and (iii) proxies for both the state of the world (potential revenues from alternative movies competing for the same time slots) and the adaptation decisions (what movies were actually shown, and in what time slots). Our theoretical and empirical results suggest that formal contracts can be the foundation for informal relationships that achieve efficient adaptation in fluctuating environments.