中國(guó)人民大學(xué)張雨瀟在中國(guó)人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院進(jìn)行了一場(chǎng)題為內(nèi)部合謀與熊彼特式增長(zhǎng)的代理成本的講座，講座的主要內(nèi)容是：

　　本文分析了公司的內(nèi)部組織和成長(zhǎng)的過(guò)程之間的聯(lián)系。我們提出一個(gè)熊彼特式的增長(zhǎng)模式，即壟斷企業(yè)面臨由于組織內(nèi)部管理人員之間勾結(jié)的代理成本。這些費(fèi)用會(huì)影響投資的積極性和創(chuàng)新在經(jīng)濟(jì)中的利率。當(dāng)串通是自我實(shí)施的，更高的增長(zhǎng)和更富有創(chuàng)造性的破壞縮短又將在組織勾結(jié)劑的時(shí)間跨度，使內(nèi)部勾結(jié)更加難以為繼。我們分析增長(zhǎng)和代理問(wèn)題之間的這種雙向的機(jī)制，并展示如何側(cè)承包企業(yè)和經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長(zhǎng)速度中的交易成本，同時(shí)獲得。

　　原文：This paper analyses the link between the internal organization of the firm and the growth process. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which monopoly firms face agency costs due to collusion between managers inside the organization. These costs affect incentives to invest and the rate of innovation in the economy. When collusion is self-enforcing, higher growth and more creative destruction shortens in turn the time horizon of colluding agents in the organization and makes internal collusion more difficult to sustain. We analyze this two-way mechanism between growth and agency problems and show how the transaction costs of side-contracting within the firm and the growth rate of the economy are simultaneously derived.