臺灣中央研究院研究院楊春雷博士在對外經(jīng)濟貿(mào)易大學(xué)作了一場題為“自愿離職作為進行外部合作的一種制裁?”的講座，楊春雷博士畢業(yè)于德國Dortmund University，現(xiàn)任臺灣中央研究院研究員。他的研究興趣是微觀，博弈理論和實驗。他的研究成果發(fā)表在Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, European Economic Review, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Experimental Economics等期刊上。此次講座的主要內(nèi)容是：

　　如何激發(fā)合作伙伴，實現(xiàn)長期合作時，雙方有自由單方面終止的關(guān)系?在本文中，我們首先使用實驗室實驗來研究在自愿分開的重復(fù)囚徒困境博弈(VSRPD)合作怎么弄的。我們觀察到的行為模式，與出針鋒相對經(jīng)常假設(shè)在文獻中不一致(Eeckhout，2006; Fugiwara - 格雷夫和奧野-Fugiwara，2009年，羅布和陽，2010)。在我們的實驗中，大多數(shù)球員寧愿留在他們背叛的合作伙伴，然后進行報復(fù)，在下列期間(S)。我們提出了一個所謂的親合作命題的命題，也是作為一類新的平衡點的稱為CD-隨遇平衡來解釋如何永恒的合作，可以與這些在實驗室中觀察到的行為特征來實現(xiàn)。使用根均方偏差測試表明，我們在VSRPD理論預(yù)先擬合數(shù)據(jù)比所有文獻中所討論的策略顯著更好。

　　原文：How do partners elicit and achieve long-term cooperation when both parties have the liberty to unilaterally terminate the relationship? In this paper, we first employ a laboratory experiment to investigate how cooperation comes about in a voluntarily separable repeated prisoner’s dilemma game (VSRPD). We observe behavioral patterns that are inconsistent with out-for-tat often assumed in the literature (Eeckhout, 2006; Fugiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fugiwara, 2009; Rob and Yang, 2010). In our experiment, most players prefer to stay with their defecting partners and then retaliate in the following period(s). We propose a proposition called Pro-Partnership Proposition as well as a new class of equilibria called CD-Indifferent Equilibrium to explain how eternal cooperation can be achieved with these behavioral traits observed in the lab. Tests using root-mean-squared deviations suggest that our advance in theory of VSRPD fit the data significantly better than all the strategies discussed in the literature.