廈門大學管理學院邀請李寧忠老師作了一場題為“ Restrictions on Managers’ Outside Employment Opportunities and Asymmetric Disclosure of Bad versus Good News(對經(jīng)理人以外的就業(yè)機會，對好消息壞的不對稱披露的限制)”的講座，廈門大學管理學院現(xiàn)設有工商管理在職研究生一級學科博士學位授權點(含會計學、企業(yè)管理、技術經(jīng)濟與管理、旅游管理)，工商管理博士后流動站，6個教科類碩士學位授權點(會計學、企業(yè)管理、技術經(jīng)濟與管理、旅游管理、管理科學與工程、系統(tǒng)工程)，2個專業(yè)碩士學位授權點(MBA、EMBA)。在職研究生講座的主要內(nèi)容是：

　　本研究調(diào)查的自愿披露的企業(yè)管理人員的境外就業(yè)機會的限制的影響。在不可避免披露原則(IDD)通過在美國的州法院承認其企業(yè)從加入或在他們的解雇形成與競爭對手公司的經(jīng)理總部設地方較大的限制。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，相對于好消息，壞消息的不對稱扣繳大于在承認IDD比的其他國家，而這種效應在更大的機構投資者持股，分析師以下內(nèi)容，董事會獨立性的企業(yè)弱。這些結(jié)果表明，管理人員的境外就業(yè)機會的限制，對公司信息披露行為有顯著意想不到的效果。我們通過顯示相對于好消息，壞消息的不對稱扣繳較大的國家有競業(yè)禁止協(xié)議，勞動合同，從加入或形成一個競爭的公司禁止員工更嚴格的執(zhí)法進一步驗證了這一結(jié)論。我們也記錄了對信息披露的國際直撥電話及競業(yè)禁止協(xié)議的影響是漸進對方。

　　原文：This study examines the effect of restrictions on managers’ outside employment opportunities on voluntary corporate disclosure. The recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by courts in the U.S. states in which the firms are headquartered place greater restrictions on the managers from joining or forming a rival company upon their dismissal. We show that asymmetric withholding of bad news relative to good news is greater in states that recognize the IDD than in other states, and that this effect is weaker in firms with greater institutional ownership, analyst following, and board independence. These results suggest that restrictions on managers’ outside employment opportunities have a significant unintended effect on corporate disclosure behavior. We further validate this conclusion by showing that the asymmetric withholding of bad news relative to good news is greater in states with stricter enforcement of noncompetition agreements, employment contracts that prohibit employees from joining or forming a competing firm. We also document that the effects of the IDD and noncompetition agreements on disclosure are incremental to each other.